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Abstract: With the signing of the recent agreement with Russia concerning the 
maritime boundary in the Barents Sea, it can nally be said that all the maritime 
delimitation lines with which Norway is concerned have been equitably resolved 
in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). is 
paper reviews the events, diculties, survey procedures and solutions that have 
led to the completion of the Norwegian maritime boundary denitions. e vari-
ous UNCLOS concepts of baselines and maritime domains (Territorial Waters, 
the Contiguous Zone, and the Exclusive Economic Zone) are explained, and ref-
erence is made to important national and international decrees and judgments 
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that have been made over the years. Particular attention is drawn to the impact 
and importance of geodetic considerations on maritime boundary denitions. 
Practical consequences have arisen through not taking these geodetic impacts 
into account, especially since the advent of satellite navigation systems has ena-
bled much improved positioning accuracy out of sight of land, while enormous 
natural resources have been identied and are being extracted from national 
maritime domains. e article gives an account of the solutions to these geodetic 
diculties that have been negotiated with neighbouring nations.
Key words: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, base-
line, territorial sea, contiguous zone, Exclusive Economic Zone = EEZ, maritime 
boundaries, geodetic datum, Norway, Jan Mayen, Svalbard, Bouvet Island.
Introduction1
On 15th September 2010, Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg of Norway and Prime 
Minister Dmitry Medvedev of Russia signed an agreement in Murmansk on the 
mutual maritime boundary in the Barents Sea. !e last remaining agreement on 
Norwegian maritime boundaries with neighbouring states was thus in place. !e 
agreement was subsequently rati"ed by the Norwegian Parliament and the Russian 
Duma, and it came into force on 7th July 2011.
It is therefore timely to look back at what happened concerning boundaries and 
their associated baselines up until the completion of this agreement. It is equally 
timely to review how the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has 
involved application of the science of geodesy.
The Story behind the Norwegian Baselines
Sovereignty at sea has been in question ever since nation states emerged. Sovereignty 
was for a very long time determined, according to the principle of power projec-
tion, as being a “sea mile,” where a sea mile was the distance by which a cannon 
ball could be projected. However, the length of the sea mile was somewhat variable, 
depending as it did on nations individual abilities with their cannon.
!e Nordic sea mile in the 17th and 18th Centuries was standardized to be a 
“German mile” equal to one "#eenth part of one degree of longitude on the equa-
tor – in other words four minutes of longitude (on the equator). !is “German 
mile” was therefore equal to four of the modern nautical miles. !e English sea 
1. !e article is developed on the basis of Bjørn Geirr Harsson, “Norske gunnlinjer, sjøgrenser 
og FNs Havrettskonvensjon,” in Kart og Plan (71) Nr 1/2011, p. 52 –62.
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mile, on the other hand, was set to one twentieth of a degree of longitude on the 
equator, which is equal to three modern nautical miles. A sea mile could there-
fore be either three or four nautical miles, depending on whether one was using 
German or English standards.
A Royal Decree for Denmark and Norway was issued on 22nd February 1812 
which stated that its territory extended one sea mile from the outer island or islet 
which never becomes submerged by the sea due to high tides. At that time the 
Danish and Norwegian de"nition of a sea mile was one "#eenth of an equatorial 
degree of longitude. Using Bessel’s Figure of the Earth, this distance on the equa-
tor worked out to be 7420.438 metres (today, one "#eenth part of an equatorial 
degree of longitude, which is equal to four modern nautical miles, or 4 x 1852 = 
7,408 metres).
Later, in the 1860s, Swedish "shermen began to appear on the banks o$ the 
coast of Møre, somewhat to the irritation of Norwegian "shermen. !is was the 
background for a further Royal Decree dated 16th October 1869 which established 
exclusive "shing rights for Norwegian "shermen within a straight line parallel 
with and one sea mile outside the straight line from the outer edge of Svinøy to 
the outer edge of Storholmen. !is line was a little over 26 nautical miles long, and 
provided the basis for an important principle for which Norway has subsequently 
received international support. !is is the principle of using straight baseline seg-
ments to de"ne maritime boundaries.
!e line mentioned in the Royal Decree dated 16th October 1869, which established exclu-
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!e early part of the 20th Century saw a number of commissions with the task of 
setting accurate de"nitions of the Norwegian maritime boundaries. !eir conclu-
sions led to a further Royal Decree of 12th July 1935 which established a base line 
consisting of straight segments o$shore north of the Arctic Circle (latitude 66° 
28.8’ N). !e Decree contained the positions of 47 base points (which de"ned the 
ends of the baseline segments) numbered in ascending order from the Russian 
Frontier at Grense-Jakobselv westwards around to Træna.
!e July 1935 Decree provoked a degree of international irritation, especially 
amongst British "shermen, who asserted that a relatively large sea area had sud-
denly been declared under Norwegian jurisdiction and thus restricted to the ex-
clusive use of Norwegian "shermen. !e British view was that the baseline from 
which maritime and "shing boundaries should be calculated should systematically 
follow the coastal low water line. !e two sides to the argument were unable to 
reach an acceptable compromise, and in the end Great Britain took the matter to 
the International Court in !e Hague. !e Court’s verdict was handed down in 
December 1951 and supported the Norwegian point of view. By ten votes to two, 
the Court found that the Norwegian method of computing baselines was not in 
con&ict with International Law. !e Court’s reasoning was related to the peculiar 
geographical conditions along the Norwegian coast, where the islands had to be 
seen as part of the same whole as the mainland.2
!e remaining Norwegian base points from Træna southwards to the Swedish 
border were established by the Royal Decree of 18th July 1952, shortly a#er the 
Hague verdict was handed down. A formal but minor change was then promul-
gated on 17th October the same year. !e completed baseline thus came to consist of 
straight line segments between 123 named points, each with stated coordinates. In 
the north, base point number 1 was identical with the most northerly point on the 
land border between Norway and the then Soviet Union. !is point is at Grense-
Jakobselv, and in the agreement of 18th December 1948 between Norway and the 
Soviet Union, this point was given as point 415 (buoy with stake). In the south, 
base point number 123 coincided with border point number XX as de"ned in the 
Norwegian-Swedish Border Agreement of 1909. (Point XX was a buoy marked 
with the Roman numeral for 20.)
Nothing is to be found concerning the geodetic datum in the Royal Decrees 
of either 1935 or 1952. A geodetic datum speci"es the Figure of the Earth that is 
being used, giving ellipsoid size and &attening, as well as the datum point from 
2. NOU 2007: 13 Den nye sameretten, Chapter 11.2.3.
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which coordinates are measured3. !ese technical details were not perceived as 
particularly relevant at the time of these Decrees. On the other hand, not having 
proper geodetic speci"cations became a distinct di*culty later on.
In 1975 the Norwegian Foreign Ministry informed the Geodesy Division of the 
Norwegian Mapping Authority (Statens kartverk) that new delimitation line nego-
tiations with Great Britain were about to be undertaken. !e main issue was the 
continuation of the median line northwards from the northernmost point of the 
1965 agreement (latitude 61° 44' 12'' N) and along the shared border with Great 
Britain up to the southernmost point on the median line between Norway and 
the Faroe Islands.
Geodesy Division began by carrying out check surveys at "ve base points on 
the west coast that would be used in the median line computations together with 
Great Britain. !ese showed that the published baseline coordinates in “Sjøkart 
351” (Chart 351 published by Norges Sjøkartverk, 1952) were systematically be-
tween 100 and 300 metres too far to the east.
!e original base points had been selected from older mapping which, although 
perfectly satisfactory at the time of publication, was perhaps of lesser reliability 
than demanded by modern standards. !is was therefore thought to explain the 
discrepancy in these coordinates. It was thus decided to put in hand a systematic 
resurvey of all base points surrounding the Norwegian mainland and coastal is-
lands. At this point, at the start of this project, it was taken for granted that the 
o*cial lists of coordinates for the base points in “Sjøkart 351” from 1952 had used 
European Datum 1950 (ED50) as geodetic datum.
3. Specifying a geodetic datum implies also specifying a coordinate system. !e associated (and 
inevitably necessary) ellipsoid is de"ned with an equatorial radius (in metres) and a &attening 
factor which speci"es the relationship between the ellipsoid’s equatorial and polar radii. !e 
de"ning parameters of a selected ellipsoid are essential in the reduction of surveys to obtain 
terrestrial coordinates. Ellipsoids historically were devised to "t as closely as possible to na-
tional or regional terrain. It is only with the general use of satellite navigation and surveying 
systems that global ellipsoids have developed. Not unnaturally, global ellipsoids "t to regional 
terrain rather worse than regional ellipsoids. Physically, the Earth has an irregular shape that 
only approximately follows an ellipsoidal form. !us, it would be very wrong to assume that 
the centres of radii of all ellipsoids are at the same point at the “centre” of the Earth – they 
can be up to hundreds of metres apart. !erefore, the coordinates of a physical point on the 
Earth’s surface, whether in Earth-centred Cartesian co-ordinates or in geographical latitude 
and longitude co-ordinates, can never be assumed to be the same regardless of which ellip-
soid is being used. In the case of the Norwegian waters as an example, the di$erence between 
ED50 and EUREF89 co-ordinates can “appear” to be up to 207 metres in North-South and 
81 metres in East-West.
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Later, during the dispute between Norway and Denmark of 1988–93 concern-
ing the maritime boundary between Jan Mayen and Greenland, copies of original 
Norwegian parliamentary documents were found, which clearly showed that the 
coordinates of the 123 base points in the o*cial lists were given with respect to the 
Modi"ed Bessel Ellipsoid. !e fact that the coordinates in the o*cial list of base 
points referred to a di$erent ellipsoid than the one used in ED504 could explain 
most of the discrepancies found during the check surveys, although some of the 
di$erences were clearly due to the lesser accuracy of the older mapping that had 
been used. !is discovery underlined the need for resurveying of the base points. 
!e work was carried under the technical management and responsibility of one 
of the authors (BGH), and was completed in the summer of 1989.
Survey Procedures
Classical geodetic methods were used during the "rst years of base point resurveys. 
Four survey teams were &own out by helicopter to triangulation stations which 
had clear line-of-sight to the base point. !e teams would deploy 3–4 hours before 
low water, and would check in by radio as soon as they were ready to observe. At 
that time the project leader would be &own out to the day’s "rst base point. !e 
"rst task was to reconnoitre the area to make sure that the assumed base point 
was acceptable. Where there was some doubt, the helicopter would be directed to 
alternatives so that sight lines could be con"rmed.
Once the base point had been "nally selected, the helicopter was directed to 
hover for about "ve minutes with a red painted oil barrel hanging directly over the 
point. !is would normally be long enough for the survey teams to complete the 
necessary observations using the oil barrel as sighting target. In some cases it was 
possible to actually place the oil barrel on the ground during observations close 
to the actual base point. In this event the project leader was required to compute 
the distance from the barrel to the point (normally 2 – 5 m).
!erea#er photographs were taken from the air for identi"cation purposes, 
while the survey teams reported their observations by radio so the project leader 
could assess whether the observations had satis"ed the observing speci"cations. At 
this stage the decision would be made as to whether further observations would be 
required or not. If not, then the teams would continue on to the next base point.
4. ED50 is based on the International Ellipsoid – the “Hayford Ellipsoid” – which has distinctly 
di$erent size and shape parameters than the Modi"ed Bessel Ellipsoid. !e International 
Ellipsoid has equator radius: a = 6,378,388 m, &attening: f = 1/297; and Modi"ed Bessel 
Ellipsoid: a = 6,377,492.0176 m, f = 1/299.15281285.
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In this way su*cient observations were collected to enable subsequent com-
putation of the coordinates of base points with respect to the national geodetic 
datum. !e accuracy of this method was assumed to be better than 3 metres, and 
usually around 1 metre.
Tides and the timing of survey observations
!e di$erence between low water and high water in the Oslo Fjord and south-
westwards around towards Stavanger is relatively small – less than 0.5 metre. It 
was therefore not normally necessary to be very concerned about observing at low 
water. Northwards from Stavanger right up to the Russian border at Varanger, 
however, observations were scheduled during the 4 hours of lowest tide water, 
as the tide di$erence is up to approximately 3 metres. Particularly critical base 
points such as small reefs were attempted when the tide was at its lowest. For base 
points on Jan Mayen and Svalbard (Spitzbergen), the low water time frame was 
increased to 6 hours.
Surveying of Base points at Svalbard, Jan Mayen and 
Bouvet Island
Baselines for a large part of the Svalbard archipelago were originally surveyed by 
classical geodetic methods and o*cially established on 25th September 1970. !e 
!e helicopter was directed to hover for 
about "ve minutes with a red painted oil 
barrel hanging directly over the base point, 
1977.
Measuring directions by theodolite to a base 
point in Sogn og Fjordane, West Norway, 
1977.
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arrival of satellite positioning technology, however, generated a need for improved 
accuracy. Most of the Svalbard base points were therefore resurveyed using GPS 
by the Norwegian Polar Institute during the 1990s, and new base point coordinate 
lists were developed in cooperation with the Norwegian Mapping Authority. A 
total of 196 base points were established to encircle the "ve archipelagic groups 
of Svalbard: Bear Island, Hopen, Kong Karls Land, Kvitøya and Nordaustlandet/
Edgeøya/Spitsbergen.
!e baselines for Jan Mayen were based on coordinates from surveys early in 
the 1950s, and were promulgated by the Prince Regent’s Resolution of 30th June 
1955. At that time, the position of Jan Mayen Island in the Atlantic Ocean had been 
determined by astronomical observations. Subsequently, the Norwegian Mapping 
Authority was instructed by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry to resurvey the Jan 
Mayen baselines in connection with the aforementioned dispute with Denmark. 
!e "eld work was accomplished in 1991 by means of a GPS antenna mounted on 
the fuselage immediately above the pilot’s seat in a Lynx helicopter. !e survey was 
made by hovering the helicopter vertically above each of the base points in turn 
all around the island. !is was in fact the "rst time that GPS had been used for 
baseline surveying. Later, in 2000, these measurements were used with a view to 
baseline revision for the whole island. !e end result was 42 base points covering 
the whole island. !e baselines are straight in all except three segments where the 
baseline actually follows the low water mark.
Bouvet Island’s position in the South Atlantic Ocean was originally determined 
during 1978–79 using the TRANSIT Doppler Satellite system, and the Island was 
later surveyed by aerial photography. No "eld work was undertaken to determine 
baselines. Instead, in 2000, and at the request of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, 
the Norwegian Mapping Authority de"ned a baseline round the Island to re&ect 
low water mark. !is was done by reading coordinates of 31 base points from 
mapping at a scale of 1:20,000 that had been produced by the Norwegian Polar 
Institute in 1986. !e Island’s coast is so irregular, and these points are so close 
together, that it was found that 31 points were su*cient for de"ning the 12 nauti-
cal mile territorial waters and the other maritime boundaries further out to sea.
Publication of Norwegian Baselines and Territorial Waters 
Boundaries
Observational data from the baseline surveys were computed and reduced by 
Geodesy Division with respect to the EUREF89 datum system. Publication of the 
base point coordinates was arranged in close collaboration with the Norwegian 
Foreign Ministry.
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!e "rst set of base points to be published was in fact for Svalbard. !ese were 
promulgated by FOR 2001–06–01 nr 556: Forskri! om grunnlinjene for sjøterritoriet 
ved Svalbard published by Royal Decree dated 5th May 2001. !ese were closely fol-
lowed by the base points for Jan Mayen promulgated in FOR 2002–08–30 nr 943: 
Forskri! om grensen for det norske sjøterritorium ved Jan Mayen and published by 
Royal Decree of 30th August 2002
!e base points for mainland Norway came next by FOR-2003–10–10 nr 222: 
Forskri! om endring i forskri! om grunnlinjene for sjøterritoriet rundt Fastlands-
Norge published by Prince Regent’s Resolution of 10th October 2003. Here a total of 
103 base points were listed to cover the coast of mainland Norway, a#er a critical 
review had found that 20 of the original 123 points could be discarded without 
con&ict with UNCLOS technical requirements. In this review base points were 
rejected if they were found to be just a few metres o$ the straight line connecting 
the neighbouring base point on each side. A#er this reduction of base points the 
maximum distance between two neighbouring base points (44,3 nautical miles) 
did not exceed the longest distance between the 123 old base points. Among the 103 
chosen base points were all the base points with their coordinates as used during 
the negotiations with Great Britain and the Faroe Islands in the 1970s.
In the lower part of the picture, Norwegian base point number 20, named Vesterfallet i 
Gåsan (Troms, North-West Norway). !e longest distance between any two neighbouring 
base points at the Norwegian mainland is from Vesterfallet to base point number 19 (44,3 
nautical miles).
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With e$ect from 1st January 2004, Norwegian territorial waters were extended 
from four to twelve nautical miles (22,224 m) from the baseline around the main-
land. !e change was established in Norwegian Law by LOV 2003–06–27 nr 57: 
Lov om Norges territorialfarvann og tilstøtende sone [territorialfarvannsloven], 
which also applies for Svalbard, Jan Mayen, Bouvet Island, Peter I’s Island and 
Queen Maud’s Land.
Finally, Bouvet Island’s base points were promulgated by FOR-2005–02–25 nr 
174: Forskri! om grunnlinjen for sjøterritoriet ved Bouvetøya, published by Royal 
Decree on 25th February 2005.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)
As long ago as the 1920s the League of Nations had attempted to clarify issues 
related to coastal nations’ baselines and maritime borders, but without success. 
!ese issues were inherited by the United Nations which held its "rst conference 
on the Law of the Sea in Geneva in 1958. !e conference addressed the provisions 
on maritime law, especially with a view to the technical developments of the time. 
!e need was recognised for international conventions to regulate coastal nations’ 
sovereignty over sea areas, as well as regulating "shing and the conservation of 
natural resources in the open ocean.
Concerning the delimitation of territorial waters, the 1958 conference accepted 
the judgement handed down by the International Court in !e Hague in 1951 with 
regard to the previously mentioned dispute between Norway and Great Britain. 
!e International Court had accepted the Norwegian claim that an irregular coast-
line with many headlands, islands and reefs was best represented by baselines 
drawn as straight lines between the outermost headlands, islets and reefs that are 
exposed at low water.
UNCLOS Baselines and Maritime Boundaries
!at which is now called UNCLOS (the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea) was adopted by 119 nations in Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 10th December 
1982. !e Convention came into force on 16th November 1994, thirty days a#er 
the 60th nation had rati"ed it. By early 2011, a total of 161 nations had rati"ed the 
Convention.
!e Convention contains 320 Articles which regulate coastal and island nations’ 
rights and duties connected to their coastal sea areas. Article 5 of the Convention 
states that the baseline shall follow the coastline at low water mark, and this would 
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be known as a “normal baseline.” Article 7, meanwhile, states that “in localities 
where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands 
along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines join-
ing appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.”5
No other forms of baseline are described in the Convention. Further, the 
Convention gives no maximum distance between base points for a coastal nation. 
For island states, meanwhile, 125 nautical miles is given as absolutely the greatest 
allowable distance between base points. Furthermore, the manual “!e Law of the 
Sea. Baselines: An Examination of the Relevant Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea,” published by the United Nations, shows that 
the longest distance between two Norwegian base points is slightly less than 48 
nautical miles (referring to the Hague ruling from 1951), so it is recommended that 
no coastal state should exceed this distance between two neighbouring base points.
When baselines are de"ned by means of coordinates, the following UNCLOS 
related maritime boundaries can be deduced:
1. Territorial Waters, determined in accordance with UNCLOS to be 12 nauti-
cal miles outside the baseline. !e Convention also makes it clear that no 
coastal nation may claim territorial waters beyond the median line with a 
neighbouring nation. Meanwhile, within Territorial Waters, national laws 
apply without hindrance.
2. !e Contiguous Zone – 12 nautical miles outside Territorial Waters (i.e. 24 
nautical miles outside the baseline). In the Contiguous Zone, the coastal 
nation has the right to take action against smuggling and the plundering of 
wrecks.
3. !e Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). !is zone is de"ned to be 200 nautical 
miles outside the baseline, on condition that a neighbouring nation is distant 
by at least 400 nautical miles. Coastal nation sovereignty in the EEZ covers 
the continental shelf and ocean "shing.
4. A coastal state may in some cases claim a continental shelf limit further 
out than 200 nautical miles from the baseline. However, documentation is 
required based on seabed topography and geophysical research. UNCLOS 
Article 76 speci"es the acceptance requirements for extending the continen-
tal shelf de"nition beyond 200 nautical miles. One of these speci"c require-
ments is associated with a further boundary of 350 nautical miles beyond 
the baseline.
5. From http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm (ac-
cessed December 2011).
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A separate UN commission has been established to review information with 
respect to UNCLOS Article 76 in cases where a nation’s continental shelf ex-
tends beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines. !is commission is entitled the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), and has 21 members 
drawn from UN member nations. !e members are experts in the "elds of geol-
ogy, geophysics and hydrography. Norway has been represented by Harald Brekke 
from the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate for two "ve-year terms.
Norway has submitted such information to CLCS for areas beyond 200 nautical 
miles in Smutthavet, Smutthullet and an area north of Svalbard. Recommendations 
have been received from the CLCS respecting the outer limit of all these areas ex-
cept a small part north in Smutthavet. Norway has indicated its agreement with 
the recommendations, and legislation of its outer limit of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles based on the recommendations received from CLCS 
is under preparation.
In addition, and as a consequence of the UNCLOS, the UN has established 
its own special court called the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS). !e Tribunal functions in accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS 
and its Annex VI. ITLOS is the central forum available to states, to international 
organizations, and to private entities for resolving disputes about how UNCLOS 
should be interpreted and applied.
!e "rst case for ITLOS, "e M/V "SAIGA" Case (Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines v. Guinea), Prompt Release, was submitted to the Tribunal on 13 
November 1997. To date, nineteen cases have been submitted to the Tribunal.6
Since 2000 ITLOS has been permanently located together with its administra-
tive sta$ in Hamburg. !e ITLOS Court meets as necessary and consists of 21 
judges elected by the UN member nations. !ere is no Norwegian judge elected 
to ITLOS, while Bjørn Geirr Harsson became the ITLOS geodetic consultant in 
early 2011.
A number of the UNCLOS Articles (16, 47, 75, 76 and 84) are directly related to 
geodesy, where it is clearly stated that where the baseline or maritime boundary 
is given as a list of coordinates, then the geodetic datum shall also be speci"ed. It 
is clear that experts on the Law of the Sea have now understood that coordinates 
given without their associated geodetic datum will be ambiguous. Many geodetic 
datum systems have been used over the years and decades, but in today’s age of 
6. !e number of cases is given in: http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=10&L=0 (December 2011). 
It should be noted that nations may alternatively use the International Court of Justice or 
third-party arbitration to resolve maritime boundary disputes. 
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satellite navigation and positioning, the size of the associated reference ellipsoid’s 
semi-major axis (the GRS80 Ellipsoid) is known to within a decimetre.
Despite the UNCLOS requirement for the geodetic datum to be stated, un-
fortunately some nations’ baseline and sea borders regrettably remain published 
without this information.
Geodesy Division’s Technical Responsibility for Maritime 
Boundaries with neighbouring Nations
While the work of UNCLOS continued on the international level, Norway under-
took maritime boundary negotiations with neighbouring nations. An agreement 
on the border in the North Sea between Norway and Great Britain, north from 
the border with Denmark to latitude 62° 44' 12” north, was signed in early 1965. 
!e parties agreed to follow the median line principle for the division, and ruler 
and dividers were used. At that time, the Norwegian Hydrographic O*ce acted 
as the Foreign Ministry’s technical advisors. As a "nal check of the coordinates 
of median line turning points, results were sent to the Geodesy Department at 
the Norwegian Geographical Survey (now the Norwegian Mapping Authority).
!e Department’s leading geodesist at that time, Gunnar Jelstrup, carried out 
these checks using mathematical methods with well known geodetic formulæ. 
!e results were remarkable, if not to say frightening. Jelstrup found that the 
southernmost median line point was 12,931 metres nearer to the Norwegian coast 
than to the British coast. On further investigation, Jelstrup found that the par-
ties had used mapping on the Mercator projection for measuring out the median 
line. Mercator projection maps are perfectly normal for maritime use because a 
sailing course set out on the map will be exactly the same as should be followed 
using the ship’s compass. However, it is also well known that the mapping scale 
increases with increasing latitude northward and southward from the equator. In 
this case, the Norwegian base points were further north (with a bigger scale factor) 
than the British base points. !is was to Norway’s disadvantage when trying to 
place median line turning points that would be equally distant from both coasts.
It was considered that this map projection issue had been an oversight. Moreover, 
the paper charts that had been used were at quite a small scale – 1: 631,000 – in 
other words one millimetre on the chart represented 631 metres in reality. Clearly 
the solution was to compute the median line turning points using well established 
geodetic techniques, and the values so obtained were duly adopted.
Later in 1965, a similar median line agreement was reached with Denmark. In 
the case of the boundary with Sweden, the boundary from inner Idde>ord to the 
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outer edge of territorial waters (at that time at four nautical miles) had been agreed 
in the agreement of 1909 a#er a round of arbitration in !e Hague.
Latterly, ever since 1965, geodesists from the Geodesy Department (later the 
Geodesy Division) have continued to act as technical advisors to the Foreign 
Ministry with regard to national maritime boundaries.
Boundary Negotiations with the Soviet Union/Russia
Norway "rst approached the Soviet Union with a view to resolving mutual bound-
ary issues in 1967. !e Soviet standpoint at that time, however, was that there was 
nothing to discuss, because as far back as 1926 the Soviet Union had declared 
Soviet sovereignty over the land area in a sector right up to the North Pole between 
the meridians at longitude 32° 04' 35" east and through the Bering Straits at longi-
tude 168° 49' 30" west. (!e Soviet Union had in fact accepted the Svalbard Act of 
17th June 1925 and had moved the western sector line eastwards to longitude 35° 
E between latitudes74° N and 81° N.) It should be noted that the 1926 Declaration 
was meant to apply to land areas, and made no mention of sea areas. It can only 
be surmised that in the intervening decades the declaration became understood or 
interpreted to also determine sea area sovereignty between these two sector lines.
Contact with the Soviet Union nevertheless continued in the 1970s, primarily 
concerned with "shing and shrimping rights. Jens Evensen and Arne Treholt suc-
cessfully negotiated an agreement in early 1978 in which a so-called “gray zone” 
was de"ned. !e gray zone could be described as a roughly rectangular area de-
scribed by six corner coordinates, where the majority of it would actually have 
been within Norwegian territory as would have been determined using median 
line speci"cations. Unfortunately, this agreement about the gray zone turned out 
to be somewhat inconvenient in the years that followed.
!e delimitation of the Barents Sea then became an issue, however, once both 
Norway and the Soviet Union, together with 117 other nations, had signed the 
UNCLOS in 1982. Negotiations to "nd a boundary line that would be a com-
promise between the Soviet sector requirements and the Norwegian median line 
claims continued throughout the 1980s. !e area lying between the sector line 
and median line was called ‘the disputed area’ (which incidentally had nothing to 
do with the gray zone), and the area was estimated to be 175,211 km2. Norway's 
mainland with coastal islands, by comparison, has an area of about 324,000 km2, 
and the whole of Denmark's land area amounts to approximately 43,000 km2. In 
other words, the disputed area could only be described as relatively large.
Geodesy Division was tasked by the Foreign Ministry with computing the size 
of the zones connected with the disputed area, as well as distances to the junctions 
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of various potential boundary line crossings and other parameters that demanded 
geodetic expertise for computation on the ellipsoid. Bjørn Geirr Harrson, as a 
geodesist from the Norwegian Mapping Authority, was a regular member of the 
Norwegian maritime boundary negotiating delegation, working with neighbour-
ing nations from 1977 until his retirement in 2005.
!e delimitation line between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea, agreed in 2010 and 
 e$ective from 7th July 2011.
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An important point in the early 1990s was to agree which geodetic datum 
should be used for determining the coordinates that would be quoted in the even-
tual agreement. Up to that time, Norway had usually used the NGO1948 national 
geodetic datum, while Russia also had its own national datum system, known 
as Pulkova 1942. Eventually, later in the 1990s, the negotiating parties came to 
agree that the WGS84 geodetic datum would be used. Subsequently, in 2010, the 
negotiating parties "nally settled on a boundary line which divided the disputed 
area almost equally.
!us was a 43-year-old dispute "nally resolved. In fact, Norway had now 
reached agreement with all neighbouring nations in the Northern Hemisphere. 
Of the Norwegian dependencies in the Southern Hemisphere, only Bouvet Island 
has baselines and territorial boundaries de"ned. !e other Norwegian dependen-
cies in Antarctica are covered by the Antarctic Treaty of 1st December 1959, which 
is an international agreement on the ice and land areas south of 60 degrees south 
latitude.
The Maritime Boundary with Great Britain
While negotiations with the Soviet Union (from 1991 the Russian Federation) con-
tinued, Norway also undertook negotiations with the other neighbouring nations 
and generally arrived at agreements within one to three years. !e agreement with 
Great Britain concerning the northern part of the median line up to the tripoint 
between Norway, Great Britain and the Faroe Islands was concluded in 1977–1978.
A negotiating delegation arrived in London in 1977 to open talks with Great 
Britain about the continuation of the median line northward from point no. 8 of 
the 1965 agreement. Immediately, an interesting di*culty emerged. Point no. 8, 
the end point of the 1965 agreement, was at 61° 44' 12" north latitude. When the 
new median line was computed, however, the starting point of the new line was 
found to lie about 300 metres west of Point no. 8. !e Norwegian delegation ar-
gued that the shortest distance from the southern delimitation line to the northern 
one would be to follow a line perpendicular from old point no. 8 to the start of 
the new median line. However, the old median line at that point would cause that 
perpendicular to have a direction slightly south of west, and this would be slightly 
to Norway’s advantage.
In contrast, the British delegation considered that the 1965 agreement had been 
satis"ed by the de"nition of a speci"c value for the latitude of point no. 8, so one 
could not continue the median line northwards from a point to the south of point 
no. 8.
bjørn geirr harsson and george preiss
124
!e disputed area between the old and the new median lines amounted to no 
more than some 16,000 m2. However, experience from further south had shown 
that enormous values could be at stake. !e delegations were therefore unwilling 
to give up more sea area than absolutely necessary. !e delegations thus decided 
to hold over their decisions on this matter until a subsequent meeting that took 
place in Oslo some six months later.
Informal enquiries among the international legal communities suggested that 
the Norwegian proposed solution would be unlikely to be supportable. !e British 
proposal of following the circle of latitude was considered rather more likely to be 
defensible, and, at the next negotiating conference, "nal agreement was reached 
on the northward extension of the Norwegian-British median line from the end 
of the 1965 agreed line up to the beginning of the Norwegian-Faroes line.
The Maritime Boundary with the Faroe Islands, around 
Jan Mayen and the Svalbard Archipelago
Now that the median line with Great Britain was completed, agreement concern-
ing the Norwegian-Faroe Islands median line followed in 1979. !is agreement 
essentially presented no geodetic challenges, since it concerned a simple straight 
line between two points 61 km apart.
!en, in an agreement of 1980, Norway assented to the Icelandic claim for an 
unrestricted 200 nautical mile zone in the direction of Jan Mayen. Agreement 
with the Icelandic claim entailed yielding almost 30,000 km2 of sea area, which 
in fact lies within 200 nautical miles of the Jan Mayen coastline. When, however, 
negotiations began with Denmark concerning the median line arrangements be-
tween Jan Mayen and Greenland, Denmark made a similar claim to that which had 
been made by Iceland. In this case, Norway did not accept the Danish claim, and 
Denmark consequently took the dispute to the international Court in !e Hague. 
!e Court’s judgement, handed down in 1993, was that the disputed area of some 
64,500 km2 would be divided approximately 60% to 40% in favour of Norway. !e 
"nal delimitation line between Jan Mayen, Greenland and Iceland was established 
as a result of negotiations that took place in Reykjavik in October 1997.
Negotiations on the maritime boundary between the Svalbard Archipelago and 
Greenland began towards the end of 2004. !e only di*culty with this boundary 
was a &at island about two km long called Tobias Island. Tobias Island had been 
discovered as late as 1993, some 80 km o$ the coast of Greenland. !e negotiating 
teams were quickly able to "nd an acceptable solution based on a median line, and 
agreement was "nally reached early in 2006.
norwegian baselines, maritime boundaries
125
Delineation of Norwegian waters as in 2010, immediately before the "nal agreement between 
Norway and Russia.
Conclusion
!e basis for Norwegian maritime boundary negotiations with neighbouring na-
tions has been the principle of de"ning median lines. !ese median lines should 
be de"ned so that the distance from the median line to the two opposing baselines 
is equal. Further, if a curved median should be desired, then a large number of 
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coordinated points would be needed to de"ne the curve with satisfactory accuracy. 
A practical solution was to replace the curve by a series of straight line segments, 
mathematically selected so that both nations received and relinquished equal areas.
With the arrival of satellite positioning technology it has become possible to 
detect positions at sea with an accuracy of about one metre. Naturally enough, 
one cannot set up boundary markers at sea in the same way as on land, so one is 
inevitably dependent upon mathematical solutions. Geodesy therefore had to play 
a central role in "nding good solutions for maritime boundary de"nitions that 
were reliable to an accuracy better than could be detected – centimetre level – and 
that could be used for diplomatic negotiation. !ese solutions were unavoidably 
dependent on geodetic formulæ and computing techniques in order to provide 
coordinates with the required level of accuracy.
Norway has managed to expand its sea area signi"cantly over the past 45 years 
by means of negotiating with neighbouring nations on the basis of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). !e table below shows that 
the Norwegian Sea area is now more than two million square kilometres.




Sea Area within the Perimeter 
of the Norwegian Economic 







Mainland Norway  
(including coastal islands)
323 802 965 066 1 288 868
Jan Mayen 377 293 083 293 460
Svalbard Archipelago 61 022 860 805 921 827
Sum of Mainland Norway, 
Jan Mayen and the Svalbard 
Archipelago
385 201 2 118 954 2 504 155
Approximate area in the 
Barents Sea arising from 
the newly signed agreement 
with Russia
2 033 950 2 419 150
!e above square kilometre values for the Barents Sea are computed based on the Norwegian 
median line claims. !e agreement with Russia divided the disputed area into two appro-
ximately equal parts. !e exact area of the Norwegian sector had not been computed at the 
time of writing. !e last line in the table above therefore shows approximate values adjusted 
to the agreed boundaries.
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!e Norwegian Mapping Authority’s dedication to developing accurate de"nitions 
of baselines, and participation in subsequent international negotiations, represents 
a solid investment of time and resources and demonstrates Norway’s ability to help 
resolve complex multilateral maritime concerns.
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Аннотация 
С недавней ратификацией договора с Россией о морских границах в 
секторе Баренцевого моря, можно, наконец, сказать, что делимитация 
морского пространства, о котором беспокоилась Норвегия, справедливо 
разрешена в соответствии с Конвенцией ООН по морскому праву (UNCLOS). 
В статье рассматриваются события, трудности, обзор процедур и решений, 
которые привели к завершению процесса определения норвежско- 
российской морской границы. В статье также объясняются различные 
концепции UNCLOS, такие как фактические обстоятельства и морское 
пространство (территориальные воды, прилежащие зоны, и исключительная 
экономическая зона), и делается ссылка на ряд важных национальных 
и международных постановлений и решений, которые были приняты 
за последние годы. Особое внимание читателя обращается на влияние и 
значение геодезии в определении понятий по морской тематике, измерений 
и расчетов в морском пространстве. В силу несовершенства и устаревания 
этих геодезических определений проявился ряд практических последствий, 
особенно с появлением навигационных спутниковых систем, которые 
позволили значительно улучшить точность позиционирования скрытых 
из вида участков земли. Благодаря последнему, появилась возможность 
выявить огромные природные ресурсы, которые в настоящее время 
извлекаются из морских недр. В статье предлагаются возможные решения 
этих геодезических трудностей, по которым можно провести переговоры с 
соседними странами.
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